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ChapterX 
The Great Repression: 
Criminal Punishment in the Nineteen-Eighties 
Michael Mandel* 
Introduction 
Even before the stock market plummeted in October of 1987, 
parallels were being drawn between our era and the years just before 
the Great Crash of 1929. According to the experts, in each era an 
extraordinarily narrow concentration of wealth was aided and 
abetted by governments that were strikingly similar in their non-
doctrinaire support for big business, combining handsome subsidies 
on the one hand with a laissez-faire approach to regulation and taxes 
on the other. Each era was seized by a takeover/merger mania 
financed by spiralling debt and fragile credit devices such as "margin 
buying" (in the 1920s) and "junk bonds" (in the 1980s). The stock 
market was widely believed, in each era, to be completely out of 
touch with the strength of the economy, and based instead on pure 
speculation (Davis 1987; Thomas 1987; Galbraith 1987), the whole 
thing resembling a mass game of chicken. Both periods saw 
quantum leaps in Canada's integration into the American economic 
orbit: the twenties was the decade in which U.S. capital bought out 
Canadian manufacturing and extraction industries, and the eighties 
was the decade of the Free Trade Agreement. Each decade started 
with a severe recession and the second half of each saw a boom 
which created unheard-of wealth, but also unheard-of inequality; 
spectacular profits were made amid falling wages and farm incomes. 
Even the moral crusade of the late eighties, the "War on Drugs," 
seemed like a replay of Prohibition, complete with its hypocrisy, 
*The. author wishes to thank William Evans and Elain Bright for their help 
compiling tables and graphs, Caroll Barrett and Maggie Stockton for their 
stenographic work, and Harry Glasbeek, as always, for his friendly advice. For 
reasons of space, several sections of this paper had to be omitted, which may 
account for (some of) the disjointedness. 
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international adventurism, official and unofficial violence, and, 
naturally, the fortunes being made from it (Thompson 1985:63-69, 
77-96, 138-157, 193-195; Granatstein et al. 1986:197-203). 
Conventional wisdom holds that a crash of 1929 dimensions would 
be very different this time around, what with social "safety nets" and 
the "general cushioning effect" of Keynesian fiscal policies 
(Galbraith 1987:64). But there is reason to believe that the results of 
the next crash will be much worse than they were after 1929 
because, on at least one very important index, the appropriate 
comparison for our times is not with the period just before the Great 
Depression but with its very depths. This is the index of repression. 
("'In criminal punishment terms, the Great Depression was more 
) repressive than any period before, and as repressive as any period 
'\ 
l since, except our era. 
1'~ As far as criminal punishment is concerned, the 1980s was the 
most repressive decade in Canada's history. During that decade, the 
per capita prison population reached and sustained an all-time post-
confederation high. This occurred at a time when the official 
philosophy of corrections emphasized "community" above all else. 
The emphasis on community was due to the fact that in relative 
terms--but only in relative terms--imprisonment is a declining form 
of punishment. Since the 1960s, imprisonment has been greatly 
outstripped by the growth of penal measures that operate outside of 
the traditional prison setting. The most prominent of these is the 
probation order, a device of infinite variety: from the occasional 
meeting with a probation officer, through unpaid work ("community 
service"), to conditions identical to imprisonment ("probation 
hostels"). On any given day, there are now three times as many 
people serving sentences of probation as there are in prison. Of 
course, this should not be allowed to obscure the fact that our 
imprisonment rate is higher than it has ever been. And this is in 
addition to a probation population never before seen in Canada's 
history. 
Canada's Most Repressive Decade 
The prison population 
In determining the relative repressiveness of various periods in 
Canadian history, we are at the disadvantage of lacking consistent, 
comprehensive data. Comparable adult imprisonment figures 
covering all of Canada are only available since 1955. However, the 
method of reporting has changed significantly in two major respects. 
In the first place, since 1979 a distinction has been made between 
those "on register" and those "actually in" a given prison. This 
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reflects the growth in the 1970s and 1980s of lawful absences from 
prison, especially "day parole." Since these mechanisms are part of 
~e new "cornn:unity" form of punishment, it would be misleading to 
mclude them m a comparison of prison populations in the past 
especially since there were no comparable forms of lawful absence~ 
during the periods of high prison populations prior to the current 
one (eg. 1961-1965 and 1931-1935). Consequently, I have tried to 
stick to the "actual in" counts, though sometimes these have had to be 
~stimated. The second major change affecting comparability of data 
is the Young Offenders Act (YOA), which came into force in April 
1985. The effect of this was to transfer a large number of offenders 
fron: adult court an~ ad1:1lt punishment to youth court and youth 
pumshment because 1t raised the age of majority for criminal law 
pu~oses fr~m between 16 and 18, depending on the province, to a 
umform national age of 18. This, and this alone, is responsible for 
the apparent fall-off in the adult prison population after 1985. 
However, to adopt the new definitions for comparison purposes 
would also be misleading, because 16- and 17-year olds are still 
being imprisoned; in fact they are being imprisoned in greater 
numbers than they were before YOA. The only real difference is 
that they are being imprisoned under different legislative mandates. 
To merely accept the reclassification as determinative would make 
long-term historical comparisons impossible. I have tried, therefore 
to adjust the figures to counteract this "Young Offenders Act effect. 11' 
Ontario keeps separate figures for 16- and 17-year olds sentenced 
under the YOA and I have used these to project a national effect 
C?ased on Ontario's share of the relevant measures). I have then 
simply added these projected national figures to the conventionally 
reported adult imprisonment figures.I It turns out that, even apart 
from the YOA, the 1980s were the most prison-prone decade in 
Canada's history, but not to take account of the YOA effect would be 
to unnecessarily minimize the trends of the decade. Furthermore, 
excluding .these numb~rs gives the completely misleading impression 
that the pnson population started to fall drastically in the late 1980s. 
Appendix Table I shows that in each of the years 1983 through to 
1988 the per capita prison population exceeded the previous record 
high (for the period covered by the table) of 1963 by between 2.7 
per cent and 9 .5 per cent. The average prison population per 
100,000 Canadian population for the five year period 1984-1988 
e~ceeded the five-year period 1961-1965 (the previous five year 
high) by 111.3 to 103.6 (a difference of 7.4 per cent). The decade 
average for 1980-1988 exceeded the 1960s average by 105.6 to 
99. 7 .2 The average prison rate for the 1970s was only 89.3 per 
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100,000, with a high of 96.4 in 1977. Since 1955, therefore, the 
current period is clearly the most repressive in terms of the 
proportion of the Canadian population in prison on any given day. 
To reach back farther, we have to use proxy figures. The "total 
institutional population" (Appendix Table. II) has the advantage of 
ooino back to 1916; but it has the considerable disadvantage of not 
dis~guishing between adult and juvenile detention. This tab.le shows 
that the hioh imprisonment period of 1961-1965 was also higher, on 
average ci23.2 per 100,000), than any other period since 1916, 
including 1930-1934 (117.3), though the rate for its highest year in 
total institutional terms (1964:125.9) was slightly lower than the rate 
for 1932 (126.1), the depths of the Depression. To estimate the adult 
rate for the Depression so that it can be compared with the 1980s 
requires deflating the Depression figures to remove the element of 
juvenile imprisonment. This results in an average adult 
imprisonment rate for 1934 of between 98.6 an~ 105.3 per lOO;DO? 
(depending on the assumptions one makes),3 puttmg the Depressions 
worst years well below the levels reached in the 1980s. The n:ost 
repressive year of the Depression era, 1932 (0.2 percentage pom!s 
above the most repressive year of the early 1960s), would, on this 
calculation, be assigned an adult imprisonment rate of between 105.7 
and 113.24 per 100,000 Canadian population, still below the 1987 
level of 114. If the entire decade of the 1930s is considered, the 
relative severity of our era becomes even more obvious. The 
average total (including juvenile) imprisonment rate for the 1960s 
was 118.7 per 100,000; it was 99.7 for adult institutions. For the 
· 1930s as a whole, the average total institutional population was 113.1 
per 100,000, from which can be estimated an adult population of 
between 95 and 101.5 adult prisoners per 100,000 population, 
compared to the 1980s adult institution average of 105.6.5 
The only figures we have going back all the way to 1867 are for 
the penitentiary population (Appendix Table III; Figure 1). In 
Canada, "penitentiary" has a specialized meaning: p~isons 
administered by the federal government. Consequently, these figures 
leave out of account those prisoners serving sentences in provincially 
administered institutions, a varying percentage of the prison 
population which has always constituted more than half of the total 
prisoners. The penitentiary population has varied as a p~rcentage of 
the total prison population from a low of 26.7 per cent m 1937 t~ a 
high of 43.5 per cent in 1974. On the other hand, :vhile 
"penitentiary," is a purely jurisdictional term and does not designate 
any particular type of prison, Canadian criminal law has always 
reserved "penitentiaries" (i.e., federally-administered prisons) for 
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prisoners serving sentences of two years or more, i.e., the longest 
sentences. So the penitentiary population can serve as an index of 
penal severity: at any given time, what proportion of the Canadian 
population are serving prison sentences of two years or more? Here, 
too, the current era takes the prize. The average penitentiary 
population for 1984-1988 was 42.9 per 100,000, while for 1931-
1935 it was only 38.2. 














































So, in terms of imprisonment, the 1980s were the most repressive 
years in Canada's history, including the years of the Great 
Depression.6 Of course, imprisonment is not the only form of state 
repression and certain other forms were more typical of the Great 
Depression than of our own era. One such form was the death 
penalty (Appendix Table IV). There were 83 executions for murder 
in the years 1931-1935, almost twice as many as during the five-year 
period either preceding or following, and over one-third more than 
any other period in Canada's history (the next blood thirstiest period 
was 1946-1950, with 62 executions). The Depression was more 
violent in terms of the death penalty than any era before or since. 
There have been no judicial executions in Canada since 1962. In 
purely quantitative terms, these numbers are very insignificant: 
adding them to the prison population does not change the rounded 
per 100,000 population rate at all. But state-sanctioned killing 
cannot just be ignored. On the other hand, our era has no right to be 
complacent about its lack of capital punishment. Deaths "by legal 
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intervention" (that is, killings by police or prison guards), judicially 
sanctioned, were far from unknown in the 1980s. In the years 1980-
1986 (the latest for which figures are available), such deaths 
numbered 63, or 9 per year (Statistics Canada 1980-86). 
Furthermore, deaths of prisoners averaged 77 a year for the last ten 
years for which information is available (1979-1?88); of thes~, ;'3 
per year were suicides--about 6.5 times the Canadian rate (Stat1st1cs 
Canada 1987-1988: Table 31; 1980-86). There are no readily 
available figures with which to compare our era and the 1930s in this 
respect} . . . 
In quantitative terms, far more s1gmf1cant th~n deaths were ~e 
great number of deportations that took place durmg the Depress10n 
(Appendix Table V). The deportations for the years 1930_-1933 
were almost triple the per capita rate for any four years m the 
nineteen-eighties. Adding deportations to imprisonment ~hanges the 
picture considerably, making the 1980s at most only slightly more 
repressive than the 1930s (122.7 to 121.3), and perhaps even less 
repressive (122.7 to 127 .8), depend.ing on. the. formula used. 
Whatever the formula, adding deportat10ns to 1mpnsonment means 
that the period 1930-1934 was substantially w_orse than 1984-1~88 
(146.4/153.l to 124.7); it also means that th~ high rat~ of repress10n 
for 1932 far outweighed the rate for the fiscal penod 1982-1983 
(178.7/186 to 130.4). 
It is important to determine whether the number of persons 
deported should be added to the number of persons impris_oned. 
Should deportation be regarded as on the same level of repress10n as 
imprisonment? There is no question that a large i:u~ber of 
Depression deportations were meant to supplement the cmmnal law 
system. In the first place, there are many d?~umente_d cases of the 
use of deportation to rid the country of political radicals, some of 
whom had been convicted of crimes and had already served terms of 
imprisonment (Roberts 1988:48-52). Secondly, deportation was used 
"as an alternative to relief," an explicit means of "'shovelling out' the 
unemployed" (Ibid 1988:162,169). On the other hand, there are a 
number of documented cases of people who wanted to be deported, 
especially to the British Isles (:Vhe:e ~ost of the dep_ortees wound 
up) because of the desperate situation m Canada (Ibid _1988:185). 
Tbinos could be substantially better at home and deportat10n meant a 
free if uncomfortable, passage. While the government's claim of 90 
per' cent voluntary deportees was certainly exagge~ated (Ibid 
1988:181-82), it is hard to know where the truth hes. More 
importantly, there is a great difference b~tween i~prisonn:e~t and 
deportation to one's home country (assummg one is not clalffilng to 
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be a refugee). For one thing, the state's concern with the deportee 
ends at the border; the deportee, as such, is under no sentence of any 
sort in the home country. For another thing, the element of 
enforced isolation is lacking; in the 1930s, whole families were 
deported along with the breadwinner (Ibid 1988). 
Of course, the point is not to minimize deportation, or even the 
desperate conditions of working people neither deported nor 
imprisoned. What we are trying to grasp, and what distinguishes 
certain periods in our history, especially our own, is the level of 
state repression, the repression of the public sphere as opposed to 
the private sphere. In this regard, deportation seems much more like 
probation than imprisonment. Imprisonment localizes punishment 
and surveillance in an isolated institution. Probation and related 
measures, such as parole, extend punishment and surveillance beyond 
the walls of the prison into the community, where, at various levels 
of restraint, the off ender is kept under surveillance and required to 
carry out certain duties, more or less onerous depending on the 
circumstances of the case. Some probation can certainly be more 
repressive than deportation. Deportation, where involuntary, 
follows the offender to the border and then says goodbye; probation 
and related measures follow the offender into the community and 
keep an eye on him or her for years. 
Whether or not the correct analogy for deportation is probation, it 
is clear that probation must be taken into account in any 
quantification of repression. If that is so, then the Depression, 
deportations and all, is no match for the current era in terms of 
repression. 
The probation population 
In comparison to the prison population, the probation population has 
grown not only steadily but spectacularly. This is almost entirely a 
post-World War II development. There was some probation before 
the War, but it was on a tiny scale. Ontario appointed the first two 
adult probation officers in 1922, but progress was slow and there 
were only eight of them altogether in Ontario between 1930 and 
World War II (McFarlane 1966:31-32). These were the only adult 
probation officers in the entire country (Canada 1956:13-14; 
Sheridan and Konrad 1976:254). Only 14 officers in all had been 
appointed in Ontario by 1951 (McFarlane 1966:62). Then, suddenly, 
between 1952 and 1956, the complement grew from 15 to 94 (Ibid 
1966:67). By 1965 there were 167 (Ibid 1966:96-97). Subsequent 
developments in admissions can be seen from Appendix Table VI. 
While jail admissions outnumbered probation admissions by 9:1 in 
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1965, this ratio had dropped to under 7:1 by 1972, to under 3:1 by 
1976, down to just over 2:1 in 1979, where it has hovered since. At 
the same time, the rate of probation admissions grew from about 98 
per 100,000 population in 1965 to 367 pe~ in its peak year of 1982. 
Another indication of the rate of growth 1s that between 1951 and 
1979 Ontario's adult probation officer complement went from 15 to 
429 (including supervisors) (Hatt 1985:300). 
Other provinces shared this experience. Alberta was the second 
province with adult probation services in 1940 and British Columbia 
followed in 1946 (Sheridan and Konrad 1976:254). The number of 
probation officers in British Columbia just about doubled every five 
years from 1950 through 1975, from 6 officers to 266, an increase 
in rate from about .5 per 100,000 British Columbia population to 11 
per 100,000 (Ibid 1976:254-255). The adult probation system in 
British Columbia employed 350 officers in 1979-1980 (13.5 per 
100,000 population) (Hatt 1985:300). National probation figures do 
not exist for earlier than 1978-1979, and since that time they have 
remained fairly stable, with probation accounting for roughly one in 
every four admissions to the correctional system (Appendix Table 
VIII) (Ontario's roughly one in three is high on the national scale.) 
But admission rates are nothing compared to average daily 
population rates (Figure 2). Somewhere between 1965 and 1972, 
the number of adults on probation in Ontario, which had been 
insignificant, indeed verging on non-existent prior to 19?0, 
surpassed the number of adults in prison. By 1975 the figure, which 
had more than doubled in relation to Ontario's total population, was 
also more than twice as high as the prison population. By 1979 it 
was more than three times as high, and by 1983 Ontario's adult 
probation population was more than four times its adult prison 
population (Appendix Table VII).8 Once again _the national 
dimensions are similar, if slightly more modest, with the adult 
probation population at approximately three times the prison 
population (Appendix Tables IX). 
We can now return to our comparison with the Great Depression. 
During the 1980s (1980-1988), the average daily a.dult population 
under judicially ordered control and supervision, including prison, 
probation, parole and mandatory supervision, was 429.8 per 100,000 
(422.4 for 1979-1988), with a high of 462 in 1987. If deportations 
are added to this, the total "repression rate" can be calculated at 
446.8 per 100,000 for 1980-1988 with a high of 471.6 in 1986-1987. 
This is 3.5 times our best estimate for the 1930s, a rate of between 
121.3 and 127.8. The particularly repressive years of 1984-1988 
had an average rate of 465.8 per 100,000, more than 3 times the 
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most repressive Depression years of 1930-1934, with an estimated 
rate of between 146.4 and 153.1. The peak year of 1987, with a rate 
of 471.6, was more than 2.5 times the Depression high rate of 
between 178.7 and 186 in 1932. 
It is true that there was some minor Depression probation activity 
which probably should be added to the figures we have already 
calculated, if only for the sake of completeness. They do not change 
the picture at all, however. There were only 8 probation officers 
operating in Ontario during the Depression compared to 429 in 
1979. Ontario accounted for all of the Depression probation for 
adults, but only about 52 per cent of probation in the 1980s 
(Statistics Canada 1987-1988:125). There was also a form of parole 
in the pre-War period, but it was entirely lacking in enforceable 
conditions, or the parole officers to enforce them. This means that 
probation/parole levels during the Depression could be no more than 
about 1 per cent of what they are now, even assuming constant 
caseloads, which seems very unlikely, as caseloads appear to have 
more than doubled between 1965 and 1979 alone.9 But even 
assuming constant caseloads, this would mean a maximum of about 
900 cases in total during the Depression, or about 9 per 100,000; 
adding this to the figures for the 1930s does not change things at all. 
The 1980s remain more than 3 times as repressive as the 1930s, the 
late 1980s 2.9 times as repressive as the early 1930s (the worst years 
of the Depression), and 1987 2.4 times as repressive as 1932, which, 
until the 1980s had been Canada's worst year for repression.IO In 
other words, the 1980s were easily the most repressive years in 
Canada's history.11 . 
Understanding Decarceration 
Official ideologists have described the community corrections 
movement in the most glowing terms imaginable: 
Diversion is a promise! 
It is a promise that the poor, the uneducated, the disadvantaged 
and the abandoned who come in conflict with the law will 
receive the support and compassion of their communities 
(Canada 1978:10). 
Even among left-wing criminologists it is possible to find the risina 
rate of repression and the proliferation of community correction~ 
treated as "contradictory" or as "a momentous liberal compromise" 
(Taylor 1985:331). It is obvious that community corrections is 
neither promise nor compromise. The level of imprisonment has not 
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only not abated, but has actually increased with comm~nity 
corrections, which have added to the arsenal of the state techmques 
of repression that are sometimes as intrusive as the traditional forms-
-indeed indistinguishable from them in some cases--and often more 
insidious. One thinks, for example, of the electronic bracelet to keep 
the probationer or parolee under constant Orwellian surveillance; or 
of the "probation hostel," minimum security prisons where persons 
under sentence of probation mix with persons under sentence of 
imprisonment (R.v Degan 1985). The community corrections 
phenomenon has expanded the power of the state's repressive 
apparatus, and has been predictably employed to increase 
enormously the proportion of the population under criminal s~ntence 
and surveillance, with no observable impact on the level of cmne. It 
is hard to imagine a more important object of criminal law reform 
than the reversal of this trend. In Foucault's words: 
If there is an overall political issue around the prison, it is not 
therefore whether it is corrective or not; whether the judges, the 
psychiatrists or the sociologists are to exercise more power in it 
than the administrators or the supervisors; it is not even whether 
we should have prison or something other than prison. At 
present, the problem lies rather in the steep rise in the use of 
these mechanisms of normalization and the wide-ranging powers 
which, through the proliferation of new disciplines, they bring 
with them (1977:306). 
In order to stop something, though, you usually have to know why 
it is happening in the first place. Do we know what is causing all of 
this repression? Do we know anything about what causes variations 
in the repression rate? 
What strikes even the casual student of the history of punishment 
in the twentieth century is how closely changes in the repressive rate 
seem to parallel changes in economic conditions or what is often 
called the "business cycle." The Great Depression of the 1930s, and 
the recessions of the late 1950s and the early 1980s have all been 
accompanied by a steep rise in the rate of repression. The recovery 
periods of the late 1930s and the mid 1960s were both periods of 
falling repression. During the sustained period of rising repression 
that Canada has experienced since the Second World War, there has 
been an "upward drift" of unemployment rates; in other words "the 
unemployment floor has been at a successively higher level" (Ostry 
and Zaidi 1979:146). 
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Greenberg (1977) has shown a striking correlation between --" 
oscillations in the annual unemployment rate for ages 16 and over ( 
and annual admissions to Canadian penitentiaries during the years 1 
1945-1959, a correlation of 92 per cent with only a slight time lag of J 
imprisonment behind unemployment. U.S. data are reported to be 
remarkably similar. In fact, the relationship between unemployment 
and repression is fairly well-established in the criminological 
literature (Crow et al. 1989). What is not so well-established is the 
mechanism at work. Most conventional explanations of the 
connection between repression and unemployment are via an 
assumed relationship between crime and unemployment. The 
conventional explanation is that economic recession causes crime, 
and this rather predictably brings forth more repression. For 
example, Ehrlich argues that high unemployment and an otherwise 
contracting economy create greater material incentives for property 
crime and diminish disincentives such as the loss of earning capacity 
one might experience from a sentence of imprisonment (1973:529-
30, 538-39, 555). Tepperman has provided a more subtle analysis of 
the Great Depression in Canada along similar lines: severe 
conditions resulted in crimes of protest, crimes 6f "day-to-day 
survival" and crimes of just plain "craziness" (1977:176-79). 
The problem with the conventional explanation is the persistently 
weak relationship shown between the crime rate and the 
unemployment rate. In Greenberg's (1977) study, the rate of 
penitentiary admissions had nothing to do with the cdminal 
conviction rate and little to do with the crime rate itself. The 
relation between the homicide rate and the unemployment rate, 
though substantial (.22), was too weak to support the changes in 
penitentiary admissions. Greenberg concluded that: 
It thus appears that in both Canada and the United States, 
changes in commitments to prison can be explained almost 
entirely by changes in the unemployment rate. Changes in the 
number of cases entering the criminal justice system and 
potentially available for imprisonment seem to be unimportant, 
as does the crime rate (1977:650). 
Like American rates, Canadian rates of reported crime since 1960 
bear no apparent relation to the oscillations of the prison population 
over the same period. Crime rates have risen more or less steadily, 
while repression rates have fluctuated with the business cycle. The 
same was true during the Great Depression: conviction rates had 
been rising steadily from the beginning of the century and merely 
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continued to rise through the Depression, albeit at an accelerated rate 
in some categories (Tepperman 1977:181, 216). 
Such observations have lead to more complicated hypotheses. 
Some studies have emphasized the sentencing system. For example, 
one study found that when controls for average prison sentences 
were imposed, the amount of variation in U.S. federal prison 
population explained by the unemployment rate dropped from 70 per 
cent to 54 per cent. Thus, a little more than one-fifth of the 
connection between prison population and unemployment was 
explained by sentencing, with nothing explained by the conviction 
rate (Yeager 1979). Greenberg, too, concluded that the answer lay 
in the sentencing system. Though he doubted that judges consciously 
"orient their sentencing policies to the requirements of the labour 
market and that they agree on how this can best be done" (1977:650), 
he was willing to "speculate" along two lines: either that "judges are 
less willing to grant probation to offenders when they are 
unemployed, or that unemployment affects levels of community 
tolerance toward offenders, to which judges respond in sentencing" 
(Ibid 1977:650). 
Both hypotheses have their adherents. A recent study of English 
courts emphasized the way "unemployment restricts options" in 
sentencing (Crow et al. 1989:27). Controlling for offence and 
record, the authors found that an offender's employment status made 
a significant contribution to the severity of the sentence: an 
unemployed offender was less likely to be fined and was more likely 
to get probation, a community service order, or prison. The effect 
varied from community to community. It was most pronounced in 
traditionally low unemployment areas, in punitive courts, and in 
areas where unemployment was increasing from low to high (Ibid 
1989:47). Even where unemployment was high, it made a difference 
in a negative way: judges felt it important to keep an employed 
person out of jail so as not to jeopardize employment status (Ibid 
1989:61-62). 
1r- In Canada, employment status is both an empirically observable 
\ and legally accepted factor in determining a sentence, despite the lack 
~of any plausible philosophical justification (Mandel 1984). On the 
/ other hand, employment status is not considered by judges as an end 
/ in itself, but rather as a part of the assessment of the offender's 
\"_'.'character." "Fault,:' even in matters of u_ne_mploym~nt, is. an 
· important part of this. It seems far too legahstlc--especially smce 
sentencing is the most "unlegal" aspect of criminal law--to let the 
courts off the hook by assuming that they would inadvertently ignore 
the general economic climate in assessing the offender's character. 
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The hardening of official, including judicial, attitudes seems a 
more likely explanation of increased repression. Tepperman makes 
a strong case for an increase in "official punitiveness," as well as in 
real crime during the Depression, with sentencing severity and 
conviction rates rising to unheard-of heights in the early thirties and 
then falling back again (1977:62-65). The most striking evidence is 
the execution rate. As Appendix Table IV shows, the years 1931_.-,, 
1935 had the most executions for any five year period before or/ 
since, but they had fewer homicides and murder charges than the f' 
prior five year period. What they had was an 89 per cent higher \ 
conviction-to-charge rate for murder charges, and a 50 per cent/ 
higher likelihood of a death sentence being carried out. In other , 
words, despite the lower homicide rate, a person charged with j 
murder was almost twice as likely to be executed during 1931-1935 I 
than during 1926-1930. • 
The Depression was a period not only of severe deprivation but of 
extremely high working class militancy. The Communist Party 
achieved its greatest popularity and influence, the Co-operative 
Commonwealth Federation was founded, and the real fear of 
revolution lead to severely repressive actions on the part of the 
government. This included the outlawing of the Communist Party, 
the imprisonment of its leaders, and violent confrontations between 
workers and police, such as during the "On-to-Ottawa Trek" 
(Thompson and Seager 1985:222-35): 
With mounting discontent with the way Canada was being run 
during the Depression, the government, police and courts may 
have organized more tightly to punish and control the discontent 
throughout the country (Tepperman 1977:176). 
Tepperman's general hypothesis is that "the worse socioeconomic 
conditions become, the more punitive judges and juries become" 
(1977:63). Stephen Box has advanced a version of this to explain a 
similar rise of repression in the 1980s in the United Kingdom, where 
prison sentence admissions rose from 117 per 100,000 population in 
1956 to 187 in 1983, and the average prison population went from 
64 to 87 per 100,000 during the same period (1987:12). Box 
demonstrates that increases in the official crime rate, while reflecting 
real increases in crime (as shown by victimization studies) greatly 
exaggerate them.12 One United Kingdom study showed that about 85 
per cent of the increase in burglary between 1972 and 1983 was 
attributable to increased reporting (Ibid 1987:18-21). Box argues 
that some of this is due to increased willingness to report crime on 
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behalf of victims and better record keeping by police, but that it also 
reflects greater official punitiveness and fear of rebellion: 
As unemployment rises, so the surplus labour force becomes a 
body viewed more suspiciously by the governing elite, not 
because it actually does become disruptive and rebellious, but 
because it might (1987:62). 
1 \~Nevertheless, even those advancing a "punitiveness" hypothesis 
j have attributed at least some of the increase in repression to real 
J increases in crime. Recent studies have suggested that it may be 
stronger than we have thought and that the problem with the studies 
so far is that they have not been sufficiently sensitive to different 
types of crime. When crime rates are "disaggregated" into different 
types, a much closer relationship between repression and crime can 
be observed. A sophisticated cross-national study has found that 
prison rates correlate with serious crimes (homicide, robbery, 
aggravated assault, fraud) but not with minor ones (theft, burglary) 
(Moitra 1987:71, 86). This difference is something we should expect 
from the changing roles of prison and probation mentioned above. 
Furthermore, disaggregated unemployment data has shown a closer 
relationship between unemployment and crime: certain age groups 
are more vulnerable than others to being affected by unemployment, 
and their situation is better grasped by certain measures of 
unemployment (eg. participation rates) rather than others (Crow et 
al. 1989:6-10). Once again, there is clearly an exaggeration effect: 
for example, unemployed people are searched more often by police 
(Ibid 1989:10-11). 
There is much skepticism among eminent criminologists about the 
reality of the increase in crime. Chan and Ericson have shown that 
most of the post-war increase in minor crime can be accounted for 
by increases in per capita policing alone (Chan and Ericson 1981:51-
53). Furthermore, the steady rise in official U.S. crime rates has not 
been matched by victimization surveys which show the crime rate 
stable through the 1970s and actually falling through the 1980s 
(Hagan 1986:59; Siegel 1989:62-63; Chambliss 1988:32-35). On the 
other hand, victimization surveys exclude the homicide rate, which 
has also increased substantially. This increase is extremely unlikely 
to be artificial because of the difficulty in manufacturing homicides 
that have not really occurred and the high likelihood that those that 
occur will come to official attention. There is very little doubt, even 
among statistic skeptics, about the reality of the homicide increase 
(Chambliss 1988:40-41; Hagan 1986:175). Indeed, the homicide rate 
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d~rin~ the l~te 1920s and the e~rly years of the Depression, though a 
histoncal high water mark until the mid 1960s, was far below the 
averages Canada has experienced for the last two decades. Homicide 
averaged 1.1 per 100,000 between 1936 and 1966, while for the 
1930s, the average was 1.4 per 100,000. The worst five years for 
homicide in the Depression era (1928 to 1932) averaged 1.7 per 
100,000; since the 1970s, the homicide rate has averaged 2.6 per 
100,000 population, and the murder rate (only the most serious 
homicides), ~.4. The worst year for homicide during the Depression 
was 1930, with a rate of 2.1 per 100,000; since 1972, the murder 
rate in Canada has never fallen below 2.1, and the homicide rate, 
never below 2.3 (Reed 1983:221-27). Indeed, it has been argued 
that homicide rates underestimate the increase in the rate of lethal 
violence: 
Faster ambulances, better communications, transportation, and 
~~ergency room service meant better treatment for seriously 
lllJured persons, so that many who previously would have been 
homicide statistics were surviving (Hagan 1986:177). 
It is worth noting that the attempted murder rate increased more 
than four times as rapidly as the murder rate between 1962 and 1987 
(Dominion Bureau of Statistics 1962a, 1965, 1968; Statistics Canada 
1971b, 1975a, 1980, 1983a, 1984, 1985a, 1986e, 1987b). 
If murder has genuinely increased, there is good reason to believe 
that violence in general has as well, even if some part of the official 
increase is a reporting phenomenon. On the other hand, it is also 
clear that violent offenders make up a small part of the clientele of 
the total population under sentence, and can in no way account for 
either the increase in prison populations or, for the explosion in 
probation. Thus it is clear from the sheer numbers that many of 
those in comm1:1nity corrections would never have gone to prison. 
Furthermore, with what we know about the increasing punitiveness 
and intrusiveness of community corrections, it is also clear that those 
who would not have gone to prison would not have been subject to 
anything like the supervisory regime they now experience. This also 
lends support, indirectly, to the notion that much of the conduct now 
attracting probation would not even have reached the level of official 
notice before. It is hard to see the incentive for the police bothering 
to take notice of things about which nothing or virtually nothing is 
going to be done. 
None of the alternatives--increased crime, increased repression, or 
both--is very appetizing, of course. Either we are more repressed 
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because we are more victimized or we are merely more victimized 
by being more repressed. But on the best evidence, we seem to be 
left with this: downturns in the business cycle cause real crime to 
rise, and this is met by increased repression, but in a way that 
exaggerates, sometimes to a great extent, the real increase in crime. 
How is it though, that we are now more punitive than during the 
Depression? If unemployment is responsible, then the Depression 
should have been far more repressive than our own era. The 
Depression was a "total and massive disruption of the economy" with 
unemployment rates reaching more than 19 per cent, almost twice 
the worst post-Depression rate of 11.8 per cent in 1983. 
It is possible to dispute the comparability of unemployment 
figures. Modem statistics clearly underestimate unemployment by 
excluding "discouraged workers," those who have given up actively 
looking for work because there are no jobs (Chen and Regan 
1985:20-21). Also, unemployment rates do not take into account the 
growing substitution of part-time for full-time jobs. Between 1975 
and 1985 part-time workers as a percentage of all workers increased 
from 10.6 per cent to 15.2 per cent (Rinehart 1987:165-66; van 
Cleef 1985). On the other hand, it is clear that there was nothing in 
the 1980s to match the severity or abruptness of the economic 
downturn of the early 1930s, when unemployment, however 
measured, increased threefold between 1929 and 1930 and sixfold 
between 1929 and 1933, and when average per capita income was cut 
in half between 1928 and 1933 (Thompson and Seager 1985:350-51). 
Furthermore: 
The unemployed of that period were mainly adult males--the 
sole family earner--and there was no "safety net" of 
unemployment insurance or other income-support measures 
which today greatly reduce the disastrous economic effects of 
unemployment on the working population (Ostry and Zaidi 
1979:145). 
In other words, the reasons for the greater repressiveness of our 
era must be sought outside of the short-term economic fluctuations, 
which have been the object of most studies of crime and 
unemployment. The reasons must have something to do with long-
term differences between our era and the Depression. 
Several theorists have postulated a kind of self-perpetuating 
expansion of the repressive capacity of the state, which is supposed to 
have an inbuilt tendency to spread from the enclosed institutions and 
to penetrate society ever more deeply. The foremost proponent of 
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this thesis was Foucault. Foucault argued that the disciplinary 
technique, which first flourished in factories, schools, hospitals, and 
prisons, from very early on exhibited a "swarming" tendency, a 
"tendency to become 'deinstitutionalized,' to emerge from the closed 
fortresses in which they once functioned and to circulate in a 'free' 
state" (1977:211). At the beginning of the penitentiary system in the 
late eighteenth century one already sees the use of disciplinary 
mechanisms, not in the form of enclosed institutions, but "as centres 
of observation disseminated throughout society." Foucault gave the 
example of the Paris charity associations that sent out their 
missionaries on regular family visits for the purpose of reforming 
proletarian life (1977:212): 
On the whole, therefore, one can speak of the formation of a 
disciplinary society in this movement that stretches from the 
enclosed disciplines, a sort of social 'quarantine,' to an 
indefinitely generalizable mechanism of 'panopticism' 
(1977:216). 
For Foucault the prison held a special place in the disciplinary 
design. It was the mechanism which fashioned the "delinquent" (the 
dangerous individual--whose dangerousness does not reside solely in 
the offence--needing supervision) from the "offender" (the mere 
violator of laws needing no supervision). Delinquency, "with the 
generalized policing that it authorizes, constitutes a means of 
perpetual surveillance of the population: an apparatus that makes it 
possible to supervise, through the delinquents themselves, the whole 
social field." Foucault argued that this surveillance was at first "able 
to function only in conjunction with the prison" because of the 
powers of surveillance it authorized over the prisoner and ex-
prisoner population (1977:281). But soon there began to develop a 
"carceral archipelago," a series of institutions "beyond the frontiers 
of criminal law" (Ibid 1977:298). The frontiers of criminal law: 
tended to disappear and to constitute a great carceral continuum 
that diffused penitentiary techniques into the most innocent 
disciplines, transmitting disciplinary norms into the very heart 
of the penal system and placing over the slightest illegality, the 
smallest irregularity, deviation or anomaly, the threat of 
delinquency. A subtle, graduated carceral net, with compact 
institutions, but also separate and diffuse methods, assumed 
responsibility for the arbitrary, widespread, badly integrated 
confinement of the classical age (1977:297). 
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The formation of this "archipelago" had for Foucault some 
important implications. One of these was the tendency to dissolve 
the distinction between crime and abnormality. Instead: 
A certain significant generality moved between the least 
irregularity and the greatest crime; it was no longer the offence, 
the attack on the common interest, it was the departure from the 
norm, the anomaly; it was this that haunted the school, the 
court, the asylum or the prison ... You will end up in the 
convict-ship, the slightest indiscipline seems to say; and the 
harshest of prisons says to the prisoners condemned to life: I 
shall note the slightest irregularity in your conduct (Ibid 
1977:299). 
Extending the carceral system beyond legal imprisonment succeeded 
"in making the power to punish natural and legitimate, in lowering at 
least the threshold of tolerance to penalty" (Ibid 1977:301). It did 
this by giving legal legitimacy to all of the disciplines through their 
connection with the law (Ibid 1977:302) and by freeing legal 
punishment from the appearance of excess and violence: 
Between the latest institution of 'rehabilitation', where one is 
taken to avoid prison, and the prison where one is sent after a 
definable offence, the difference is (and must be) scarcely 
perceptible. There is a strict economy that has the effect of 
rendering as discreet as possible the singular power to punish, 
the carceral 'naturalizes' the legal power to punish, as it 
'legalizes' the technical power to discipline. By operating at 
every level of the social body and by mingling ceaselessly the 
art' of rectifying and the right to punish, the universality of the 
carceral lowers the level from which it becomes natural and 
acceptable to be punished. (Ibid 1977:302-03). 
The spread of disciplinary power involved its fragmentation and 
dispersal to ubiquitous practitioners: 
The judges of normality are present everywhere. We are in the 
society of the teacher-judge, the educator-judge, the 'social 
worker'-judge; it is on them that the universal reign of the 
normative is based ... The carceral network ... has been the 
greatest support, in modem society, of the normalizing power 
(Ibid 1977:304). 
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Foucault's v1s10n of the localized penitentiary mechanism 
inexorably dissolving into the invisibly carceral city is obviously a 
profoundly disturbing one. An ever larger section of the population 
comes under the sway of an increasingly superior means of 
exercising power, superior because it is more subtle, more finely 
tuned, less visible and, therefore, more acceptable. The central locus 
of Bentham's "Panopticon" turns out to have limited its ability to 
"see without being seen." Most disturbing of all is the implication 
that the growth of this power is inevitable and completely detached 
from the history of political struggle that (even on Foucault's 
account) gives rise to it. It represents an inevitable technological 
impulse which, once set in motion, we are powerless to stop. 
Though Foucault did counsel opposition, nothing in his work 
provides any theoretical foundation for it actually to occur. Indeed, 
in his view, if discipline had not already eliminated politics 
altogether, it eventually would. 
There are a number of reasons, however, to doubt this bleak view. 
If there are really no political forces driving these mechanisms, how 
is it that the decarceration boom had to await the aftermath of the 
cataclysmic events of the mid-twentieth century? Why does 
repression rise and fall with the business cycle? How is it that these 
community measures are compatible with a great expansion in the 
traditional overt, "compact" repression of the penitentiary? Why has 
the growth of the carceral city not seen the decline of the 
penitentiary? Has Foucault unduly neglected the purely repressive 
features of imprisonment, of the penitentiary as an institution for 
punishment, in his concern with the disciplinary "addition"? 
Repression implies resistance, or at least a lack of discipline. How 
can an increasingly "disciplinary society" also be an increasingly 
chaotic one where resort must increasingly be had to undisguised 
repression? 
A useful contribution to a resolution of these contradictions has 
been made by Santos who argues that there is a "structural 
combination" between the community therapy of decarceration and 
the retributive renaissance in punishment (1980:386). Both, he 
argues, are ways of replicating the social status quo while appealing 
to symbols of autonomy. Santos relies on the notion of "chaosmic 
power" to describe the repressive aspects of decarceration and other 
forms of informal or community justice. By leaving people to their 
own devices, these reforms replicate and therefore reinforce social 
power. They "integrate the sanctioning power in the ongoing social 
relationships connecting cosmic power to the chaosmic power which 
up until now had been outside its reach" (Ibid 1980:391). Where 
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retribution legitimizes the status quo through the fiction of free will, 
community therapy does so by prescribing the status quo (the 
"community") as therapy. In other words, it is the "community" not 
the "therapy" that is the key to the concept. 
In using the community, the state "is expanding through a process 
which on the suiface appears to be a process of retraction" (emphasis 
in original): 
In other words, the state is expanding in the form of civil 
society and that is why the dichotomy of state/civil society is 
theoretically not useful anymore if ever it was. And because the 
state expands in the form of civil society, social control may be 
exercised in the form of social participation, violence in the 
form of consensus, class domination in the form of community 
action. In other words, the state power expands in a kind of 
indirect rule. (Ibid 1980:391). 
The community corrections movement fits this description very well. 
Whereas the prison was meant to be the egalitarian penalty (Foucault 
1977:232), probation represents the fruition of the penitentiary 
technique's replication of the inegalitarianism of the private sector. 
Probation is an infinitely flexible instrument for the distribution of 
offenders. It can use the entire community, with its diversity, to 
situate the offender in the proper designated role. The desired 
power relations can be enforced (or not enforced as in the case of 
privileged offenders) in situ, where and when they are supposed to 
take place, not, as with prison, after some period of preparation. 
One not only teaches the delinquent habits of industry, one actually 
puts the delinquent to work. 
Apart from the enormous growth in the dimensions of the penal 
system which can be credited to the advent of community measures--
"net widening," et cetera--this added flexibility itself represents a net 
increase in power. Indeed, flexibility is what unites the 
; developments in probation with the expansion and elaboration of the 
\prison itself. Increases in the use of both probation and 
\imprisonment have been accompanied by further changes in the 
nature of both imprisonment and probation. Both have become 
more fungible, in the sense that each measure contains such great 
variety in levels of intrusiveness that imprisonment can be very 
much like probation and probation very much like imprisonment. 
Flexibility means that the differences within the notions of prison 
and community become as important as the differences between 
them. The specific designation of the sanction is increasingly 
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irrelevant. Even the conviction itself is of decreasing importance as 
the conviction melts into the discharge which melts into the diversion 
program with no admission of guilt. All of these form a great 
continuum along which offences and offenders can be subtly 
distributed, according to their prescribed role in structure of social 
power relations. 
Thus, while in the case of R. v Malboeuf (1982), in which the 
defendant was a young Native in need of "stabilization," probation 
meant the equivalent of a minimum security prison for his breaking 
and entering, for businessman A. (R. v A. 1974), it meant a $1000 
payment as "restitution" to the employee he tried to rape; and while 
for thousands of Ontario offenders, probation meant menial tasks 
such as snow-shovelling, for Keith Richards, caught in Toronto with 
22 grams of heroin, it meant two free concerts for the blind at the 
earliest convenience of the Rolling Stones (R. v Richards 1979). 
Accepting that we have a new, insidious form of power to contend 
with, we are still left trying to explain why this should be happening 
now. One attempted explanation comes from the frequently heard 
official defence of community corrections in terms of economics, 
i.e., that they constitute a great money savings over imprisonment. 
The embrace of community measures coincided with the "fiscal 
crisis" of deficit financing that hit Western governments in the 
nineteen-seventies, so many commentators have sought to explain 
community corrections this way. Santos himself favours a fiscal 
crisis explanation, supplemented by the ideological appeal of notions 
of "community" in an era in which real community is disappearing. 
Legitimacy in a time of economic contraction is more a matter of 
symbols than of "goods and services," thus the appeal to 
"transcendental values" (Santos 1980:391) such as "community" and 
"responsibility" (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1976a, 1976b; 
Canada 1977:Chapter 4). Santos believes that "state sponsored 
community organization will be the specific form of disorganization 
[of the oppressed classes] in late capitalism" (Santos 1980:390). Like 
Foucault, Santos foresees: 
a dislocation of power from formal institutions to informal 
networks. Social networks will then become the dominant unit 
of power production and reproduction, a source of power which 
is diffuse and interstitial and which as a consequence is as 
familiar as it is remote (1980:392). 
198 I Criminal Justice 
The fiscal crisis explanation has also been adopted by Scull (1977, 
1984) who treats "decarceration" as a form of carceral 
"privatization." 
Privatization has both fiscal and correctional aspects. It is the 
ideal-term designation of the 1980s movement by right-wing 
provincial and federal governments, following the example of the 
United Kingdom, to raise billions of dollars by selling off large 
chunks of the public sector, often at bargain-basement prices 
(Corcoran 1990); at the same time, the private sector itself has been 
turned over to the free play of market forces, through such 
deregulation initiatives as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement. 
The movement has many counterparts in the correctional system. 
One of these is the delivery of correctional services by private 
enterprise. 
In the United States privatization of prison services, indeed of 
entire prisons in some states, has been a way governments have 
attempted to solve the problem of the costs of building new prisons 
to cope with overcrowding (Wilson 1989:175ff.; Globe and Mail 
July 24, 1986:All, July 25, 1986:A8). In Canada, privatization has 
so far been restricted to community corrections, but that has meant 
that most of the expansion of such services has come in 
nongovernmental form, through agencies of both the "not-for-
profit" and, increasingly, the "for-profit" form (Griffiths and 
Verdun-Jones 1989:592-93). In Ontario, all community residential 
centres and agencies are privately run on contract with the 
government, as are two-thirds of the community service order 
programs (Ontario 1985:46). In the mid-eighties, the federal 
government also began to contract agencies run privately for profit 
to provide parole supervision and half-way houses (Globe and Mail 
December 9, 1986:A19). 
When public services are privatized by right-wing governments 
under a free market ideology, they generally operate more in 
accordance with market principles, which means a deterioration in 
those services delivered primarily to poor people. Even when the 
government is the main consumer in privatized service, the quality is 
reduced, because the government is seeking to reduce costs (often in 
wages to skilled, unionized employees), and because the private 
service exists to make profit. But the prison is not just another social 
service; besides meeting the needs of its clientele, it must also control 
and discipline them. Thus, we should not be surprised to learn that 
in the context of prison, privatization can mean something quite 
different from what it means in the context of other social services; 
in fact, prison privatization means quite the opposite of neglect. 
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When a major privatization initiative in parole supervision was 
announced in 1986, the government reassured the public by 
promising that the reporting requirements for parolees had been 
doubled (Globe and Mail September 20, 1986:Al 1). So privatization 
in corrections does not entail a loosening of the grip on offenders; on 
the contrary, it gives the government "more bang for its buck" and 
thus becomes a form of expansion and intensification of penal 
discipline. 
Privatization takes other forms. The rather sudden concern by the 
penal system for "the victim" can be seen in this light. Victims and 
their grievances are obviously not new; what is new is the attention 
paid to them by the penal system. Practically, this has meant making 
restitution an important part of punishment, usually as part of a 
probation order. fu Ontario, restitution orders are included in 15 per 
cent of all probation orders, amounting to $5 million worth for adult 
offenders and another half million dollars for young offenders in 
1987 alone (Ontario 1987:12,16). Restitution orders seem to 
function both as an alternative to prison for respectable offenders 
with the ability to pay (Jackson 1982:23-24), and as a means of 
toughening up an otherwise non-incarcerative sentence, in either case 
placating actual and potential victims. Both the community service 
order and the restitution order appeared with the denunciatory 
rationale of punishment (Law Reform Commission of Canada 1974a, 
1974b, 1975, 1976a), and were conceived as punitive, not 
therapeutic, devices. A greater role in sentencing is also being given 
to the victim through "victim-impact" statements (Criminal Code, 
section 735 (1.1) in force January 1, 1989) and mediation 
alternatives (Baskin 1988). As with community service orders and 
other community measures, it appears that the offenders sentenced to 
restitution are drawn primarily from offenders who would not have 
gone to prison in the first place. The authors of one study of a 
popular Ontario restitution/mediation program concluded: 
On the whole VORP [Victim/Offender Reconciliation Program] 
has contributed little to sparing off enders imprisonment. 
Instead of avoiding problems created by the use of the prison 
system, another sentencing option has been implemented which 
pulls a different set of offenders deeper into the system of social 
control and inevitably increases cost (Dittenhoffer and Ericson 
1983:346). 
The net result of the restitution initiative is to leave the punishment 
increasingly to a negotiation between victim and offender. No less 
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than in the case of economic privatization, the private sphere is not 
an equal one; negotiation is inevitably influenced by the bargaining 
strength of the parties. The availability and onerousness of a 
restitution order depends on the financial status of the offender (R. v 
Hudson 1981; R. v Sugg 1986; R. v Collard 1987; R. v Wilcox 
1988). The more the offender can pay, the more likely the offender 
will be able to buy off a more intrusive sentence. Furthermore, the 
more the offender can pay, the more likely it is that the victim can 
be persuaded to ask the court to make a restitution order instead of 
ordering a prison sentence (R. v A. 1974; R. v Davies 1988). If the 
offender cannot pay, then the offender works, either for the victim, 
or more often, under a community service order. The latest 
development combines restitution and community service through 
fines. Increasingly, offenders without money are given the choice of 
working off their fines instead of serving the time in prison (Ontario 
1986:13; R. v Hebb 1989; Globe and Mail February 10, 1989:Al l). 
These fines in turn are being earmarked for victim-assistance 
programs, as in the 1989 "victim-fine surcharge" amendment to the 
Criminal Code or the 1985 "fine-option" amendment (Criminal 
Code, ss. 718.1; 727.9). Of course, people who can afford their 
fines (which are still not set according to ability to pay) just pay 
them. This seems rather appropriate for our economic system: 
those without property must work while those with property need 
not bother. 
We have been examining the "fiscal crisis" explanation of 
community measures. The problem with purely fiscal explanations of 
this phenomenon, however, is that it has not resulted in a diminution 
of traditional repressive measures; it is part of the expansion, not the 
contraction, of the state's repressive capacity. In other words, 
though community measures clearly cost less than prisons, when both 
are expanding, the explanation cannot be restricted to governments 
trying to save money (Chan and Ericson 1981). 
In their important work on the origins of the penitentiary system, 
Melossi and Pavarini (1981) have also offered a plausible 
interpretation of the developments we have been examining. Their 
main point is to show how changing productive relations can account 
for the rise of the penitentiary as the specific form of social control 
in competitive capitalism; but they also argue that the radical changes 
which have since taken place in productive relations in the twentieth 
century can similarly account for the nature of modern social 
control. They point to the concentration, centralization and changing 
organic composition of capital, the rise of unions, state involvement 
in the economy and the disintegrating effect this has all had on the 
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once firm lines between public and private spheres. In late 
capitalism the market place becomes more and more the object of 
organization by business, union, and state: 
The sphere of circulation and consumption were subjected to the 
direct rule of capital: decisions on prices, the organization of 
the market and at the same time of a consensus, all became part 
of one and the same thing. Not only were the traditional 
instruments of social control strengthened--those areas of "the 
sphere of production" outside the factory from capitalism's 
inception--but also new instruments were created. The new 
strategy was towards dispersion, towards the extension and 
pervasion of control. Individuals are no longer locked up; they 
are got at where they are normally locked up: outside the 
factory, in society as a whole. Propaganda, the mass media, a 
new and more efficient network of police and social assistance, 
these are the bearers of a new kind of social control (Ibid 
1981:6). 
More control of the marketplace is necessitated by ever more severe 
market dislocations, such as that of the Great Depression itself; 
inefficiency and unemployment abound and capital can no longer 
afford to follow its own logic. Rising unemployment even 
diminishes the need to prepare people for the factory; more and 
more what they have to be prepared for is idleness in the 
community. Community measures become part of this attempt to 
organize the community coercively when it can no longer be relied 
upon to regulate itself efficiently. This was, in fact, the express 
rationale of those who advocated an increased role for probation in 
the 1940s in Canada. Blaming rising prison populations on the 
breakdown of "proper home training during the past quarter 
century," the call went out for better funding, co-ordination and 
"legal authority" for the state's efforts to "step in and apply the 
necessary remedy where parents are failing in their duties" (Ontario 
1943:6): 
Parents who have failed are rather likely to fail again unless 
they are sufficiently strengthened and helped by probation 
officers and others who are capable. Very often that support 
and help are non-existent. In much of this province there are no 
regular probation officers, and where there are their time and 
energies are spread over too many cases (Ontario 1945:6-7). 
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Not for one moment was probation to be confused with leniency in 
punishment; it was more and not less intervention that was being 
called for: 
Probation without proper supervision is dangerous. Too 
frequently it is worse ... Akin to the abuse of probation is the 
practice of suspending sentences without a proper follow-
through. Generally there is no follow-through. Delinquents 
and criminals are well aware of that fact. The chance that they 
will be brought back and sentenced for breach of recognizance 
or the offence on which sentence is suspended is so small that 
they boldly ignore it and pursue their way (Ontario 1945:6-7). 
Thus the ideology underpinning the rapid expansion of the Ontario 
probation system in the early 1950s was an explicitly disciplinary 
one. The increase in prison population was blamed on a lack of 
proper supervision in situ, which could only be solved by state 
intervention in the form of probation supervision. Probation was 
advocated as a kind of penal Keynesianism, a state intervention into a 
malfunctioning private sphere. It is thus no coincidence that the 
great post-war increases in the proportion of economic activity 
taking place through the state and the increase in public sector 
employment coincide with the dramatic increase in community 
measures. But, rather than one causing the other, they tum out both 
to be products of the same underlying contradiction, the increasing 
inability of an economy structured upon private profit to (a) 
reproduce itself without violence, and (b) meet our basic economic 
needs. Instead of the full development and use of the energy and 
talent of the entire population, improved standards of living, and 
decreasing inequality, we have precisely the opposite: ever higher 
levels of unemployment (Ostry and Zaidi 1979), a stagnating 
economy (Statistics Canada 1988:21-22, 28) and increasing inequality 
(Ross and Shillington 1989:34; CALURA 1988:28-29, 56; Davis 
1987:36; Globe and Mail December 30, 1989:El 1). 
This leads to a much different assessment than the one offered by 
Foucault (1977), who saw "decarceration" as a purely technological 
movement detached from politics and bound to humanity in a 
seamless web of inescapable discipline. Instead of an invincible 
movement, decarceration becomes merely a strategy for holding on 
to an increasingly unstable social situation, a strategy which seems, 
furthermore, to be fraught with its own contradictions, such as 
escalating costs and the debasement of the coinage of punishment 
through overuse (Matthews 1979). The community measures 
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phenomenon can be seen as the late capitalist breakdown in the 
separation between public and private spheres as applied to the 
penitentiary system: an attempt to expand state discipline ever more 
deeply into the community as capitalism becomes ever less capable of 
"standing on its own two feet" and traditional penal measures and 
levels of punishment become ever less capable of holding things 
together. 
NOTES 
1. As adult and juvenile regimes become more alike, the justification for 
considering adult repression separately, as the present study does, diminishes; 
however, for most of Canada's history adults and children have been subjected to 
very different legal punishment regimes. 
2. If we leave out the low year of 1969 to make the comparison more 
symmetrical, the difference is slightly less: 105.6 to 100.4. 
3. If we assume that the relationship between adult imprisonment and juvenile 
imprisonment was more or less constant between 1930-34 and 1961-1965, an adult 
rate for 1930-1934 can be estimated by applying the known adult/total ratio of 
1961-1965 to the figures for 1930-1934. This would give an adult rate of 
(103.6/123.2 x 117.3 = 98.6). 
But was the relationship constant? There seems no statistical way of knowing 
this for sure. The relative use of training school as a disposition for those found 
delinquent was similar for the periods 1930-1934 (3464/38815 or 8.9 per cent) and 
1961-65 (9771/87096 or 11.2 per cent), but not identical (Reed 1983:Z283-291). 
On the other hand, the per capita use of training school as a disposition was 6.6 per 
100,000 in 1930-1934, while it was 10.3 in 1961-1965. Per capita use of a 
disposition is a far cry from institution population per capita, but these figures still 
suggest that a higher proportion of the later than of the earlier total institutional 
population involved training schools, which means that the assumption of constant 
ratios underestimates the severity of the repression of adults in the 1930s. 
To attempt to correct for this, we can apply the 1930-1934/1961-1965 
disposition ratio of 6.6/10.3 to the proportion of the population during the 1961-
1965 period that we know constituted juvenile detention: 123.2 - 103.6 19.6, or 
15.9 per cent of the total institutional population for 1961-1965. At most training 
school seems to have been used 6.6/10.3 less in 1930-1934 than in 1961-1965, so 
the juvenile component of the 1930-1934 population can be reckoned at 6.6/10.3 x 
15.9 per cent 10.2 per cent. Therefore, to estimate the 1930-1934 adult 
population, the period's total population should be deflated by only 10.2 per cent 
.898 x 117.3 = 105.3per100,000 population. This is well below the average for 
the worst five-year period of the 1980s which was 111.3 per 100,000. 
4. On the assumption of a constant ratio between adult and juvenile imprisonment: 
126.1/125.9 x 105.5 = 105.7; on the more generous deflater outlined in the prior 
footnote: 126.1x.898=113.2. 
5. On the assumption of a constant ratio between adult and juvenile imprisonment: 
99.7/118.7 x 113/1=95.0; deflated by the formula of endnote 3 (which works out 
to .897 in this case): .897 x 113.1 101.5. 
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6. Imprisonment figures just released show a rise in the per capita adult prison 
population for the fiscal year 1988-1989; it had fallen slightly in 1987-1988. The 
rise, not adjusted for the effect of the Young Offenders Act, was 1.9 per cent for all 
institutions and 3.2 per cent for penitentiaries (Statistics Canada 1988-89). 
7. A study recently reported in the press, but not yet available to me, claims that 
prisoner deaths are at an all-time historical high (Globe and Mail May 3, 1990:A8). 
8. The reason for the difference between admission and daily population ratios is 
the fact that probation terms are generally so much longer than prison terms, 
meaning that fewer admissions result in higher average daily populations. The 
median prison sentence for provincial admissions (more than 90 per cent of all 
admissions) in 1984-1985 was 32 days, whereas the median probation term was 12 
months (Statistics Canada 1984-1985:165,173). 
9. McFarlane reports 244 probation officers in Ontario in 1965 with an adult 
probation population of 5225 (McFarlane 1966:90), while the 429 Ontario 
probation officers reported by Hatt for 1979 had to take care of at least 26,362 adult 
probationers (Hatt 1985:300; Appendix Table VII). 
10. It is possible that the early 1960s surpassed the Depression, or at least equalled 
it, but lacking better figures on probation it is difficult to be sure. 
11. Probation figures just released show a rise in the per capita adult probation 
population for the fiscal year 1988-1989; it had fallen slightly for the two prior 
years. The rise, not adjusted for the effect of the Young Offenders Act, was 1.1 
per cent. However, a simultaneous fall in the parole population kept the total non-
custodial supervised population at a constant per capita level (Statistics Canada 
1988-1989). 
12. There are parallel Canadian data on crime rates and social class area. It appears 
that the higher reported crime rates of lower social class areas are accounted for 
partly, but only partly, by higher rates of victimization. Another important 
contributing factor is the level of policing which, in effect, exaggerates the higher 
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(28,277 e) ( 111.5) 
Sources: Statistics Canada, 1979, 1982-1983, 1983-1984, 1984-1985, 1985-1986, 1986-1987, 
1987-1988; Reed, 1983:Z292-304; Chan and Ericson, 1981:77. 
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"On register" includes prisoners temporarily out of the institution, whereas "actual 
custody" does not. The on-register figures are estimates based on figures for the 
federal government and all provinces excluding: B.C. for the whole period, NWT 
for the whole period except 1982, Ontario for 1979a-1985 and the Yukon for 1988. 
It includes les (69 per cent of those on register but not in custody in the 
federal syst 87-88: Statistics Canada, 1987-1988:91), unlawfully at large 
(12 per cent), in hospital (5 per cent), at court (7 per cent), out on bail (2 per cent), 
temporary absence (1 per cent) and unspecified (4 per cent). Figures in the table 
prior to 1979 are from a different series of publications which purport to be based 
on the same principle, viz. "on register" whether or not in actual custody, but notice 
the similarity between "actual count" of 1979a (new series) and "on register" of 
1979b (old series). On the other hand, the same does not hold for penitentiary 
statistics where there is a divergence between the on-register population of the old 
series and the actual count of the new (see Table Ill). 
e Both sets of figures for 1979a-1988 are average daily or less frequent count for 
the fiscal year ending March 31st of the year named. In 1972-1979b the prison 
population is as of December 31st of the year named. For 1971 it is December 31st 
for federal and Quebec institutions and March 31st for all other provincial 
institutions. For 1955-1970 it is March 31st. The Canadian population bases for 
the rares are as of June 1st of year named 1955-1979b and as June 1st of the year 
before the year named 1979a-1988. 
The "YOA effect" is the effect on the prison population of changing (as of April 1, 
1985) the age of adulthood so far as the penal system is concerned: 16 and 17 year 
olds, who were classified as adults before that date, now became young offenders. 
An adjustment has been made to correct for the fact that 16 and 17 year olds are still 
being imprisoned, but under a different label. The adjustment is not a projection; it 
is based on the number of 16 and 17 year olds actually imprisoned during the years 
mentioned. ·The difference is that they are now imprisoned under the authority of 
the Young Offenders Act. On the other hand the figures are only estimates based on 
data pertaining to the Ontario system only. These figures have undergone 
complicated calculations in order to derive a national figure. One perhaps 
controversial move is to treat "open custody" as part of the institutional population. 
There are good legal and practical grounds for doing this, though the differences are 
not great. If open custody had been treated as non-institutional, the figures for 
1986-88 would have been: 1988:28,009 (109.3); 1987:28,168 (111.3); 
1986:28,277 (110.9). 
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IT - TOTAL INSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 1916-1974 III - PENITENTIARY POPULATION 1867-1988 
on Rate per 0 , 0 Daily Population Rate per 1 0,000 
of Canadian of All Penal Canadian Daily Rate per 100,000 Daily Population Rate per 100,000 
Institutions Population Institutions Population Penitentiary Canadian Penitentiary Canadian 
Including Including Population Population Population Population 
Training Schools Training Schools 
On register On register 
1974 20,407 91.2 1944 11,212 93.9 Actual Count 
1973 0,966 95.1 1943 10,862 92.1 1988 11,969 (10,557) 46.7 (41.2) 1941 3,688 32.1 1972 20,136 92.4 1942 10,451 89.7 1987 12,318 (11,106) 48.7 (43.9) 1940 3,772 33.1 
1971 20,124 93.3 1941 11,763 102.2 1986 12,281 (11,214) 48.4 (44.2) 1939 3,803 33.8 
1970 22,329 104.8 1940 12,951 113.8 1985 11,872 (10,857) 47.2 (43.2) 1938 3,580 32.1 
1969 23,448 111.7 1939 12,874 114.3 1984 11,359 (10,438) 45.6 (41.9) 1937 3,264 29.6 
1968 23,368 112.9 1938 13,348 120.5 1983 10,638 ( 9,775) 43.2 (39.7) 1936 3,098 28.3 
1967 23,111 113.4 1937 12,208 110.5 1982 9,765 ( 8,938) 40.1 (36.7) 1935 3,586 33.1 
1966 23,455 117.2 1936 11,154 101.9 1981 9,452 ( 8,651) 39.3 (36.0) 1934 4,220 39.3 
1965 24,179 123.1 1935 10,550 97.3 1980 9,305 ( 8,465) 39.2 (35.6) 1933 4,587 43.1 
1964 24,288 125.9 1934 11,899 110.8 1979a 9,219 ( 8,370) 39.2 (35.6) 1932 4,164 39.6 
1963 23,512 124.2 1933 12,657 119.0 1979b 9,290 39.1 1931 3,714 35.8 
1962 22,747 122.4 1932 13,255 126.1 1978 9,309 39.6 1930 3,187 31.2 
1961 21,960 120.4 1931 12,549 120.9 1977 9,335 40.1 1929 2,769 27.6 1976 9,285 40.4 1928 2,560 26.0 
1960 20,628 115.4 1930 11,223 109.9 1975 8,700 38.3 1927 2,480 25.7 
1959 20,790 118.9 1929 9,796 97.7 1974 8,499 38.0 1926 2,474 26.2 
1958 20,382 119.3 1928 8,561 87.0 1973 9,111 41.3 1925 2,345 25.2 
1957 18,301 110.2 1927 7,964 82.6 1972 8,253 37.9 1924 2,225 24.3 
1956 17,352 107.9 1926 7,593 80.3 1971 7,483 34.7 1923 2,486 27.6 
1955 18,048 115.0 1925 7,543 81.2 1970 7,337 34.5 1922 2,640 29.6 
1954 17,369 113.6 1924 7,126 77.9 1969 7,117 33.9 1921 2,150 24.5 
1953 16,383 110.4 1923 6,849 76.0 1968 7,026 33.9 1920 1,931 22.6 
1952 15,846 109.6 1922 7,601 85.2 1967 7,167 35.1 1919 1,689 20.3 
1951 15,295 109.2 1921 7,191 81.8 1966 7,438 37.2 1918 1,468 18.0 
1950 16,012 116.8 1920 6,004 70.2 1965 7,514. 38.2 1917 1,694 21.0 
1949 14,573 108.4 1919 5,442 65.5 
1964 7,651 39.7 1916 2,118 26.5 
1963 7,219 38.l 1915 2,064 25.9 
1948 13,454 104.0 1918 5,026 61.7 1962 7,156 38.5 1914 2,003 25.4 
1947 12,481 99.4 1917 5,468 67.8 1961 6,738 36.9 1913 1,970 . 25.8 
1946 11,651 94.8 1916 5,459 68.2 1960 6,344 35.5 1912 1,895 25.6 
1945 11,334 93.9 1959 6,295 36.0 1911 1,865 25.9 
Sources: Reed, 1983:2198-20 ; 2292-304; Al-14. 1958 5,770 33.8 1910 1,859 26.6 
1957 5,432 32.7 1909 1,765 26.0 
Figures are for the last day of the fiscal year: for 1916-1948 this is September 1956 5,508 34.3 1908 1,476 22.3 1955 5,507 35.1 1907 1,423 22.2 
30th, excepting Ontario (March 31st), Nova Scotia (November 30th) and Quebec 1954 5,120 33.5 1906 1,439 23.6 
(December 31st); for 1949-1970 it is March 31st except for Quebec (December 1953 4,934 33.2 1905 1,367 22.8 
31st); for 1971 it is March 31st excepting training schools, federal penitentiaries 1952 4,686 32.4 1904 1,328 22.8 
and Quebec (all December 31st); for 1972-1974 it is December 31st with no 1951 4,817 34.4 1903 1,250 22.1 
exceptions. 1950 4,740 34.6 1902 1,214 22.1 
1949 4,260 31.7 1901 1,382 25.7 
1948 3,851 30.0 1900 1,424 26.9 
1947 3,752 29.9 1899 1,445 27.6 
1946 3,362 27.4 1898 1,446 27.9 
1945 3,129 25.9 1897 1,383 27.0 
1944 3,078 25.8 1896 1,361 26.8 
1943 2,969 25.2 1895 1,277 25.4 
1942 3,232 27.7 1894 1,223 24.6 
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Rate per 100,000 
Canadian 
Population 
1893 1,194 24.2 
1892 1,228 25.1 
1891 1,249 25.8 
1890 1,251 26.2 
1889 1,195 25.3 
1888 1,094 23.4 
1887 1,159 25.1 
1886 1,200 26.2 
1885 1,112 24.5 
1884 1,039 23.2 
1883 1,113 25.1 
1882 1,127 25.8 
1881 1,218 28.2 












































Sources: Statistics Canada, 1979, 1982-83, 1983-84, 1984-85, 1985-8 , 198 -87, 
1987-88; Reed, 1983: Z173-174; Al-14; Z-292-304. 
The 1980-88 figures are average daily counts for the fiscal year ending March 31st 
of the year named; they are in all respects like the figures in Table I; the 1979a 
figures are estimates derived from a census figure reduced by the proportion of 
average population to census given in the 1982-83 report for the year 1980 for 
which we have both figures (Actual Count: 8465/8627 x 8530 = 8370; On 
Register: 9305/9519 x 9431=9219); the 1960-197% figures are a single census 
taken on December 31st; the 1906-1959 figures are as of March 31st; 1877-1905 
figures are as of June 30th; 1867-1876 figures are as of December 31st. Canadian 
population bases for the rates are as of April 1st from 1867-1901 and as of June 1st 
from 1902-1987. 
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IV - EXECUTION STATISTICS 
Number of Per Death Per Murder Per 
Executions Sentences Char,!feS Homicides 
1879-80 11 .579(19) .180(61) 
1881-85 30 .508(59) .216(139) 
1886-90 23 .535(43) .198(116) 
1891-95 14 .412(34) .135(104) 
1896-1900 26 .591(44) .234(111) 
1901-05 29 .580(50) .206(141) 
1906-10 42 .656(64) .204(206) 
1911-15 51 .405(126) .166(308) 
1916-20 47 .420(112) .162(290) 
1921-25 49 .538(91) .166(295) 
1926-30 46 .523(88) .190(242) .058(796) 
1931-35 83 .783(106) .359(231) .108(772) 
1936-40 42 .477(88) .205(205) .062(674) 
1941-45 34 .523(65) .198(172) .054(626) 
1946-50 62 .544(114) .232(267) .085(731) 
1951-55 41 .554(74) .198(207) .056(735) 
1956-60 10 .159(63) .053(190) .019(945) 
Average (excludmg 1956-8) .539 .203 .071 
Source: Zay, 1965:649 (Y61-67); Reed, 1983: Z21. 
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V - DEPORTATION AND IMPRISONMENT 1929/1939-1980/1988 
Deportation Prison Total of 
Deportation 
and Prison 






1929 1,964 19.6 97.7 
1930 3,963 38.8 109.9 
1931 6,583 63.4 120.9 
1932 7,647 72.8 126.1 
1933 5,138 48.3 119.0 
1934 1,701 15.8 110.8 
1935 675 6.2 97.3 
1936 605 5.5 101.9 
1937 421 3.8 110.5 
1938 439 3.9 120.5 
1939 413 3.7 114.3 
(Adult Institutions) 
1979-80 5,107 21.5 92.4 
1980-81 5,376 22.4 93.6 
1981-82 5,191 21.3 98.9 
1982-83 5,197 21.1 109.3 
1983-84 5,099 20.6 108.4 
1984-85 3,950 15.8 110.0 
1985-86 2,467 9.8 111.5 
1986-87 2,446 9.6 114.0 
1987-88 2,809 11.0 112.7 
Average 1930-39 26.2 95.1 * 121.3* 
26.2 101.6** 127.8** 
1930-34 47.8 98.6* 146.4* 
47 .8 105.3** 153.1 ** 
1932 72.8 105.9* 178.7* 
72.8 113.2** 186.0** 
Average 1980-88 17 105.6 122.7 
1984-88 13.4 111.3 124.7 
1983 130.4 
The figures with asterisks have been adjusted to make them comparable with figures for 
adult institutions only as per footnote 3 in the text 
* denotes deflator of 99. 7 /118. 7 
** denotes deflator of .898. 
Sources: Roberts, 1988:38; Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1940: 160; Employment and 
Immigration Canada, Annual Reports 1979/80-1987 /8 8. 
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VI - ADULT PRISON AND PROBATION ADMISSIONS IN 
ONTARIO 1965-1988 
Annual Admissions Adjusted for YOA Effect 
Prison Probation (Eate2 Ratio Prison Probation (Eate2 Ratio 
1987-88 66,170 24,168 (261) 2.7:1 72,093 30,266 (326) 2.4:1 
1986-87 64,311 23,237 (255) 2.8:1 69,719 29,296 (322) 2.4:1 
1985-86 64,466 24,555 (271) 2.6:1 68,166 28,999 (320) 2.4:1 
1984-85 67,785 30,053 (336) 2.3:1 
1983-84 68,138 28,997 (329) 2.3:1 
1982-83 71,090 29,500 (338) 2.4:1 
1981-82 65,576 31,665 (367) 2.1:1 
1980-81 65,776 31,107 (361) 2.1:1 
1979-80 60,701 29,775 (350) 2.0:1 
1978-79 61,834 27,822 (329) 2.2:1 
1977-78 59,072 21,413 (256) 2.8:1 
1976-77 59,362 18,851 (228) 3.1:1 
1975-76 54,791 19,323 (235) 2.8:1 
1974-75 54,721 17,386 (215) 3.1:1 
1973-74 56,072 13,691 (172) 4.1:1 
1972-73 56,754 11,225 (143) . 5.1:1 






1965-66 58,230 6,547 (97) 8.9:1 
1964-65 58,431 
Sources: Ontario, 1967, 1968, 1969, 1970, 1981, 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985; Statistics 
Canada, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1982-1983 through 1987-1988; McFarlane, 
1966:89(for1965); Reed, 1983:Z175-197. 
All admissions save probation admissions for 1965-1966 are for the fiscal year 
ending March 31st. Probation admissions for 1965-66 are for the calendar' year 
1965. The Canadian population bases for the rates are as of June 1st of the fiscal 
year comprehended by the admissions. 
The YOA effect is calculated as in Table I, with "open custody" treated as ' 
imprisonment. Had it not been so treated, the differences would again be small, 
with the ratios for 1986-1988 each being 2.3:1 instead of 2.4:1. 
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VII - AVERAGE DAILY ADULT PRISON AND PROBATION 












































32,011(374) 1 :4.4 
29,941(352) 1:3.8 
26,362(312) 1 :3.2 
22,631(271) 1:2.7 







Adjusted for YOA 
9809(106) 40853(e)(441) 1:4.2 
9575(105) 41,187(453) 1:4.3 
9372(103) 39,915(441) 1:4.3 
The prison data are a combination of the population of Ontario correctional institutions and federal 
penitentiaries located in Ontario. For 1978/9-1987 /8 they consist of average daily counts for the 
fiscal year ending March 31st; for 1957-1958 to 1969-1970 they are the average of the counts for 
March 31 of each year; for 1970-1971 to 1977-1978 they are the average of the counts for March 
31st of each year for the provincial prisons only, while for the federal penitentiaries they are the 
count for December 31st of the first year mentioned. The probation data are the average daily 
counts for 1978-1979 to 1984-1985; for 1970-1971 to 1977-1978 they are the average of the 
counts for March 31 of each year; for 1964-65 they are the population under supervision for 
January 1, 1965; Rates are per 100,000 Ontario population as of June 1st comprehended by the 
fiscal year. 
The YOA effect is calculated as in Table I, with open custody assigned to prison and not to 
probation. If it were assigned to probation, the ratios for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 1:4.3, 4.5 
and 4.4 respectively. 
Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1957-1959, 1960-1961, 1962, 1963, 1964, 1964-
1965, 1965-1966, 1966-1967, 1967-1968, 1968-1969, 1969-1970, 1970; Statistics 
Canada, 1971a, 1972, 1973a, 1974, 1975, 1976, 1977, 1978, 1982-1983 through 
1987-1988; Ontario, 1985; McFarlane, 1966:89. 
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VIII - YEARLY ADMISSIONS TO CUSTODIAL AND 
SUPERVISED POPULATION - CANADA 1978-1988 




1987~88 196,552 (e) 53,521 250,073 976 
(208,607) (e) (64,408) (273,015) (1,065) 
1986-87 190,108 52,749 242,857 960 
(200,973) (63,954) (264,927) (1,047) 
1985-86 190,286 54,838 245,124 967 
(197,729) (63,034) (260,763) (1,028) 
1984-85 193,602 62,986 257,714 1,026 
1983-84 199,852 63,567 263,419 1,058 
1982-83 201,690 65,550 267,240 1,085 
1981-82 183,450 66,245 249,695 1,026 
1980-81 170,874 62,875 233,749 972 
1979-80 160,078 58,631 18,709 921 
1978-79 158,428 56,342 214,770 913 

















Figures in brackets are adjusted for YOA, assuming as in Table I that open custody 
should be assigned to prison and not to probation. If it were assigned to probation, 
the percentage custody for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 75.7 per cent, 75.3 per 
cent and 75.7 per cent respectively. 
Sources: Statistics Canada, 1982-83 through 1987-88, Ontario, 1985. 
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IX - AVERAGE DAILY CUSTODIAL AND SUPERVISED 


















































































































































Figures in brackets are adjusted for YOA effect, assuming as in Table I that open custody should 
be assigned to prison and not to probation. If it were assigned to probation, the percentage non-
custodial for 1986, 1987 and 1988 would be 75.3 per cent, 75.9 per cent and 76.0 per cent 
respectively. 
Sources: Statistics Canada, 1982-1983 through 1987-1988, Ontario, 1985. 
Note: The 1987-1988 Statistics Canada report excludes lock-up data for the first time. In the 
interests of comparability they have been included in the table nevertheless. This required an 
estimate to be made for 1987-1988, based on the Statistics Canada report for 1986-1987 
where lockups for 1986-1987 are included and the report for 1987-1988 where lockups for 
1986-1987 are not included. It was assumed that the proportion of lock-ups to ordinary 
imprisonment was the same for both years. Therefore the 1987-1988 figure of 190,141 
without lock-ups was multiplied by 190,108/183,907 to get the total of 196,552. The 
same reasoning applies to daily population figures, but the numbers in this case are tiny due 
to the short duration of lockup imprisonment, so no attempt has been made to include them 
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*Total Driving includes the offences of criminal negligence causing death, criminal negligence 
causing bodily harm, criminal negligence in the operation of a motor vehicle, driving while 
impaired or with more than the allowed alcohol/blood ratio (Criminal Code), failure to remain at 
the scene of an accident, dangerous driving, and driving while disqualified (Criminal Code and 
provincial statute) 
**Driving while impaired or with more than the allowed alcohol/blood ratio and refusal to provide 
a breath sample. 
***Commencing 1986, changes were made to the Criminal Code, which affect the comparability 
of driving offence statistics. Offences were expanded to include boats and aircraft as well as motor 
vehicles. In 1986 and 1987 such offences constituted less than one per cent of the total but, the 
way statistics are reported makes it impossible to determine the precise numbers. The figures in 
the table attempt to exclude offences committed with boats and aircraft Including them would 
change the figures to 1589 and 572 for 1987, and 1604 and 587 for 1986. Also, as of 1986 the 
offences of impaired operation of a motor vehicle et cetera. causing bodily harm or causing death 
were added. Theoretically these should be included in the impaired offences because they would 
have constituted such offences before the change. But most certainly some of these offences, 
perhaps all of them, would have been prosecuted under other charges (criminal negligence causing 
death or bodily harm) before and to include them now would suggest more of an increase or less of 
a decrease in the impaired category than has actually occurred. I have therefore excluded them. If 
they were included, the figures for 1987 would be 579 (with boats and aircraft) or 577 (without) 
and for 1986:594 (with) and 591 (without). 
Calculations for 1986: Total driving: 406,635 (1604); without boats: 405,333 (1599); impaired 
driving: 150,571 (594); without harm: 148,794 (587); impaired driving without boats: 149,932 
(591); impaired driving without boats and without harm: 148,316 (585). 
Calculations for 1987: Total driving: 407,087 (1589); without boats: 405,836 (1584); impaired 
driving: 148,320 (579); without harm: 146,586 (572); impaired driving without boats: 147,741 
(577); impaired driving without boats and without harm: 146,107 (570). 
****In 1983 several changes in the Criminal Code came into effect which affect comparability. 
For the category of "sexual assault: the offences of "rape" and "indecent assault" were replaced by 
three categories of "sexual assault" in 1983; while the figures under "sexual assault" for 1962-1982 
include not only rape and indecent assault but also various forms of sexual intercourse with 
minors, seduction, as well as the offences of "gross indecency" and "buggery and bestiality", the 
figures for 1983 and afterwards are restricted to pure sexual assault. For the category "Aggravated 
Assault (Wounding)": Wounding was redefined in 1983 and partially replaced by "aggravated 
assault". The figures under "Aggravated Assault (Wounding) for 1962-1982 include all offences 
under the former section 228 of the Criminal Code, including discharging a firearm; but the 1983 
offence of aggravated assault is somewhat narrower. However, separate statistics are now kept on 
discharging firearms and I have included these in the category for 1983 and following to maintain 
rough comparability. "Other Assault": this category excludes wounding before 1983 and 
aggravated assault after 1982; it includes unlawfully causing bodily harm in all years. 
*****In 1969, the offence of driving while intoxicated was repealed and the offences of driving 
with a higher than permitted alcohol to blood ratio and of refusing to provide a breath sample were 
created. This appears to have lead to an immediate increase in the reported offence rate. 
Sources: Dominion Bureau of Statistics, 1962a, 1962b, 1965a, 1965b, 1968a, 1968b and 
Statistics Canada, 1971a, 197lc, 1975a, 1980, 1984, 1987a, Juristat Service 
Bulletin, Volume 7, No. 4 (September, 1987); for driving offences in 1986 and 
1987: unpublished statistics kindly provided to me by the Canadian Centre for 
Justice Statistics of Statistics Canada. 
